I. Introduction
Standard economic theory predicts that self-interested agents will undersupply public goods in comparison with efficient social totals. This inference derives from modeling the provision of public goods as a single-period Prisoners' Dilemma in a continuous-strategy space.
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sive form of the game, which specifies (among other things) the sequence of moves and the informational conditions under which play takes place. In designing our experiments we have been careful to specify both the SCF and the protocol so that comparisons could accurately be drawn between what theory predicts and what experimental subjects actually do.
Alternative Social Composition Functions
Public goods are defined in terms of a peculiar feature on the demand side: the amount produced is equally available for nonrivalrous consumption by all members of the community. But our standard models do not assume anything special on the supply side, specifically about the SCF, which converts individual provisions into a socially available aggregate amount of the public good. On the standard assumption, this aggregate is always the simple sum of the individual contributions. But the observation that people often overcome the free-rider problem in disaster situations provides a clue that the standard assumption about the form of the SCF may not be applicable. Such situations often correspond to "weakest-link" environments, which are characterized by the fact that failure of any unit may be fatal to the whole. In desperate circumstances in which each person must do his or her duty (and even more) if the community is to survive, what appears to be self-sacrificing behavior may actually be selfishly optimal in swinging the balance between community viability and social collapse. Table 1 displays the three simple social composition functionsrelations between the individual contributions q, and the socially available total Q of the public good that our experiments cover. The SCF implicit in the usual theory, which of course leads to the usual predic- The Weakest Link model describes a variety of situations in which each member of a social group has a kind of veto power over the extent of collective achievement. Examples might include (i) townspeople manning sectors of a levee when the river is in flood (where any person's failure means that the water will break through and inundate the entire community), (ii) military units defending segments of the front against an enemy offensive, or (iii) a group of agents responsible for dredging successive stretches of a navigation channel (since the minimum depth dredged determines how much traffic can flow). All these cases are parallel to the disaster situation. Once the usual protections and redundancies supporting the social division of labor can no longer be relied on, breakdown is in prospect unless everyone cooperates. At the opposite extreme, the Best Shot model applies when different teams engage in a contest in which "victory" benefits the entire team as a public good, while the scoring rule depends solely on the best individual performance. Examples might include (i) antimissile batteries firing under local control at a single incoming intercontinental ballistic missile, (ii) gang wars in which each "family's" gunmen aim solely to assassinate the rival don, or (iii) the mice in the fable attempting to bell the cat.)
Of course, many intermediate and variant SCFs are also possible. Table 1 could be generalized to place arbitrary ascending or descending weights on individual contributions (Hirshleifer 1984) . Or the A number of other studies have dealt, implicitly at least, with social composition functions bearing a family resemblance to Weakest Link or Best Shot. Mueller (1979, pp. 13-14) uses the term "jointness of supply" to describe a weakest-link type of situation, in which a public good will not be provided at all unless everyone contributes, and correctly indicates that free-riding should then be minimal. Bliss and Nalebuff (1984) discuss "dragon slaying," which is a best-shot type of public good. Lipnowski and Maital (1983) also discuss a best-shot situation that is even closer to the way in which we operationalize it (viz., in terms of the treatment of contributions by agents who do not provide the "best" shot). This is essentially the same as the "dragon slaying" problem in Bliss and Nalebuff (1984 Smith (1977 Smith ( , 1979a Smith ( , 1979b Smith ( , 1980 ), Ferejohn, Forsythe, and Noll (1979), and Ferejohn et al. (1982) . These protocols demonstrate the important normative possibility of designing decentralized mechanisms that will induce optimal or near-optimal public-good provision levels.
Our experiments involved only two-person groups. We employed two basic protocols: sequential and sealed-bid. The sealed-bid protocol is a simultaneous-move arrangement, following the direct contribution procedure of Smith (1979a), Isaac et al. (1985) , and Banks, Plott, and Porter (1986). Here in each two-person group the agents privately and concurrently specify their individual levels of provision for the public good. In contrast, the sequential protocol is an alternating-move arrangement. In this case one agent in each group declares his or her provision level first, that decision is then made public, and then the other makes a choice in response. As we shall see, the protocol employed importantly affects both the theoretical predictions and the behavioral outcomes.
II. Experimental Design
A summary of our experiments appears iIn table 2. All subjects were economics undergraduates at the University of Western Ontario. 6 In the sequential protocol session there were 18 subjects segregated randomly into nine groups of two. Three of' these groups were then randomly assigned to each of the social composition functions in each period. In the sealed-bid protocol session we had 26 subjects in 13 groups of two. The two sessions were run back to back, with subjects 63 The dollar payoffs to the subjects were adjusted using the exchange rate prevailing at the time of the experiments ((C$1.32 to US$1.00). Nobody ever knew the identity of his or her partner within the larger population of subjects. Furthermore, the partners were changed each period. This feature was designed to prevent possible extraneous influences, such as the desire to make friends or build reputations, from contaminating the experiment. All subjects were given the same fixed valuation schedule for the public good, valid for each experimental period, as shown in table 3 and pictured in figure 1. No subject was informed of the payoffs of any other subject in our experiments, and in particular the fact that all valuation schedules were the same was not revealed. Our theoretical analysis, in contrast, presumes that the payoffs are common public knowledge. This informational discrepancy made our experiments quite a severe test of the underlying theory. We were in effect "predicting" on the basis of a compound hypothesis that (i) each subject was a rational, selfinterested economic agent and believed that his partner was also, and (ii) the subjects correctly conjectured that their payoffs were identical. Owing to the possibility of learning, we would expect condition ii to describe the situation more accurately in later than in earlier experimental replications, and this in fact occurred (as will be explained in more detail below). However, we should point out that learning was far from trivially easy since subjects were told (as in fact occurred) that the partnership assignments were to be reshuffled each period. Thus In the sequential protocol (experiments SQ-1, SQ-2, and SQ-3), one subject in each pair was randomly selected to have the first move. The first mover was required to declare his or her own irrevocable contribution to the pair's joint provision of the public good. The other member of the pair could then use that information in choosing a best response, in the form of a second-move decision on how much to contribute in turn. Although the last mover has an informational advantage over the first mover, he is also at a severe disadvantage with respect to his ability to commit to a certain strategy. We will see that the commitment asymmetry dominates any informational asymmetry.
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In the second trio of experiments under the sealed-bid protocol (experiments SB-1, SB-2, and SB-3), each subject had to select a level of voluntary contribution in ignorance of' the simultaneous choice being made by his or her partner. Here it might be thought that the poorer information (about the other side's moves) available to the pair as a group would make it more difficult for the subjects to arrive at their self-interested optimal choices. This inference was in fact supported, to a marked extent, by our experimental results.
All subjects in the sealed-bid experiments SB-i, SB-2, and SB-3 were made familiar with the instructions given in the Appendix.
The redemption value sheet referred to in the instructions is shown in table 3 and was common to each participant in all the experiments. Our instructions closely follow those used by Isaac et al. (1985, pp. 70-73) except for the references to alternative rules and the shuffling of subjects from group to group. For the sequential experiments SQ-1, SQ-2, and SQ-3, minor modifications were introduced in accordance with the changed protocol.
III. Efficient Outcomes under Alternative Social Composition Functions
To clarify the nature of the social composition functions and to illustrate the basis for our theoretical predictions of the outcomes, the three pairs of matrices shown in table 4 represent simplified versions of the decision processes involved. In this illustration (but not in the Under Weakest Link, both members must contribute if a unit of the public good is to be generated that both can enjoy. Here the efficiency condition is MC1 + MC2 = MB1 + MB2, which is met when qI = q2 = 4. Since under Weakest Link the social amount provided is the lesser of qi and q2, the efficient social aggregate is Q = 4. Finally, under Best Shot, a unit of the public good is provided when either contributes. For efficiency here one party should contribute zero while the other should set his or her MCG = MB1 + MB2. Numerically, the member contributing should provide q, = 12 so that the social amount generated, the greater of q and q2, is Q = 12.
IV. Predicted versus Actual Outcomes
We now come to the crucial point, comparing the experimental outcomes with those predicted under the assumption of rational selfinterested behavior.
The Sequential Experiments
In these experiments the second mover, knowing his own benefit and cost schedule and having seen his partner's prior choice, could in principle always calculate his privately optimal contribution toward purchase of the public good. However, the rational choice for the first mover would depend on his partner's anticipated response. As already indicated, he does not know his partner's payoffs, nor can he be sure that the latter is a rational, self-interested player. But our prediction is that the first mover will correctly conjecture that the payoffs are identical and will presume that the partner will choose in accordance with rational self-interest when it is his turn to play. In game theory terms, this mutual rationality condition means that we are making use of the "subgame perfect equilibrium" concept due to Selten (1975) .
On these assumptions, our predicted outcomes and profits for the sequential group of experiments can be read from table 6 and are pictured in figure 2. From figure 1 , an individual's profit iri is the sum of his marginal benefits for the number of units socially provided by both partners together, less the cost of whatever units he provides himself. The subscripts 1 and 2 here identify the first mover and second mover of each trial pair.
Under the Standard Summation social composition function, the predicted rational choice on the part of the first mover is to contribute nothing (i.e., to choose q, = 0). Should he do so, the second mover is then forced in his own self-interest to provide q2 = 4 units, making the social aggregate also Q = 4. It would be foolish for the first mover to "generously" choose any positive qI. If, for example, the first mover Under the Weakest Link social composition function, the public good will be provided only to the extent that both contribute. The first mover, therefore, can be confident that a rational partner would exactly match his contribution, up to qi = 4. Our consequent prediction is q, = q2 = 4, which means that the available social total is Q = 4 as well. Finally, Best Shot is like Standard Summation in that a rational first mover will contribute nothing (q, = 0), realizing that his partner would once again be left holding the bag and forced in his own selfinterest to set q2 = 4. Since Q under Best Shot is the larger of q, and q2, the social aggregate is once again Q = 4.
The predicted payoffs for each subject vary with the SCF and with assignment to first-mover or second-mover status. They range from a high of $3.70 (to the first mover in SQ-I and SQ-3) to a low of $0.42 (to the second mover in all three cases). We assume that our experimental rewards always dominate the subjective costs to agents of computing the optimal solution.
In summary, Q = 4 is the predicted social aggregate in all three cases. Under Weakest Link, this corresponds to efficient provision of the public good, but in the other two instances it is only one-third of the efficient amount. The predicted distributions of the individual contributions differ drastically over the three cases, as indicated in table 6. It is also of interest to notice that in the two cases in which there is an advantage of one player over another (Standard Summation and Best Shot) the benefit goes to the first mover, despite the informational asymmetry in favor of the second mover.
The "actual" figures reported in table 6 and shown in figure 2 are the experimental results averaged over six periods and three replications, or 18 trial pairs for each of the three social composition functions. As can be seen, the observed results square remarkably with the theoretical predictions. Furthermore, detailed inspection of the trial-by-trial data reveals that essentially all discrepancies that appear in the pooled averages were due to mistaken choices of subjects in their very first or second decision periods. These discrepancies almost always took the form of an "excessive" contribution by the first 8 This is of course a standard proposition in public-good theory. As a slight qualification, there will in general be some "wealth effect" owing to the fact that each party's contribution enriches the other, thus making each of them reciprocally willing to purchase somewhat more of the public good. No wealth effect is allowed for in the experimental marginal benefit schedule given to the subjects. It has been shown, however, that in the provision of public goods, any such wealth effect will essentially always be of negligible magnitude (McGuire 1974; Margolis 1982, pp. 19-2 1) .
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2 15 mover in the Standard Summation and Best Shot cases or a "deficient" contribution in the Weakest Link case. Thus the parties were able to learn rapidly, despite the informational handicap to rationally optimal choice making. Hence our predicted results were satisfied quite remarkably under what we regarded as a somewhat severe test.
One possibly puzzling aspect of the data is why, since under Best Shot the relation Q = max(qj, q2) applies on any given trial, the average observed social aggregate Q = 4.062 was not identical with the average observed q2 = 3.501, which is the larger of the averaged q, and q2. The reason is that although (as predicted) under Best Shot the second mover's q2 was in fact almost always larger than his partner's qj, there were a few instances in early decision periods in which q, was larger than q2. Thus the overall averaged Q ended up higher than the averaged q2. A corresponding discrepancy in the other direction could have occurred under Weakest Link, where Q = min(qj, q2) for any given trial. But in fact it never did; in the Weakest Link experiments the second mover's contribution never exceeded the first mover's, and so the average of' the Q provided was the same as the averaged q2. Of' course, given this informational situation, it would never be rational under Weakest Link for the second mover to exceed the first mover's contribution. This difference between the Best Shot and Weakest Link outcomes is therefore another subsidiary confirmation of our rationality prediction.
The Sealed-Bid Experiments
The informational obstacles to rational decision making, already rather severe under the sequential protocol, are considerably more onerous under the sealed-bid protocol. In the sequential experiments, one of the players (the second mover) could always make his or her decision with all relevant information in the open. Under sealedbid, in contrast, each of the players had to choose in the dark as to his partner's move. Not only did this ignorance make the decision at any moment more difficult, but it also limited what could be learned from experience. So in this group of experiments we anticipated a considerably less perfect match between theoretical and actual results. (Indeed, as will be shown shortly, the theoretical "predictions" themselves become somewhat problematic.) Because of the greater anticipated variability of results, in this group of experiments we generally allowed for more periods of learning and more replications as indicated in table 2. Table 7 and figure 3 summarize the predictions and actual observations under the sealed-bid protocol.
In the sealed-bid experiments we employed the Nash equilibrium solution concept. The Nash equilibrium, for present purposes, may be defined as a strategy pair such that neither player would find it advantageous to revise his choice given the other's selected strategy. But it turns out that the Nash equilibrium is not unique in any of the cases considered; hence a supplementary principle or principles had to be appealed to. We called on two such principles. The first is symmetry. Given the completely parallel situations of the two players in the sealed-bid experiments, we selected as our predicted solution only among those Nash equilibria such that the members of each pair make equal contributions to the public good. (In the Best Shot setting, however, we must also examine asymmetric solutions, for reasons to be made clear below.) We also had to employ one other supplementary principle, Pareto dominance, to be discussed shortly when the Weakest Link case is taken up below. Under Standard Summation, the Nash equilibria constitute an infinite class of outcomes, to wit, the continuum of paired nonnegative public-good provisions that sum to four. Among the possibilities are (q , q2) = (0, 4), (3, 1), (2.5, 1.5), and so on. If, for example, the parties had chosen the respective provisions (ql, q2) = (3, 1), neither would be able to profit by a unilateral revision of his choice. The sole symmetrical member of this class of solutions is obviously (2, 2). Hence our predicted provisions of the public good are two for each player. In summarizing the actual data here, table 7 reports separately the average of the larger provisions in each pair, denoted qI., and of the smaller, denoted qs. In this symbolism, our prediction under Standard Summation is qI, = qs = 2, so that the social aggregate is Q = 4. Notice that while this predicted aggregate is the same as that for Standard Summation under the previous sequential protocol, the predicted distribution within pairs has changed drastically from (4, 0) to (2, 2).
Under Weakest Link, the Nash equilibria once again comprise a continuum of outcomes: to wit, all the pairs of the form (x, x) such that o ' x ' 4. Possible instances include (0, 0), (1.5, 1.5), (3, 3), and (4, 4) . Reference to figure 1 will indicate that, for example, if the parties had each chosen to provide three units, then neither member of the pair would want to unilaterally revise his choice. Here, since all the Nash equilibria are symmetrical, we must call on our second supplementary principle: Pareto dominance. The justification is that since all the Nash equilibria pay off equally to the parties, the most attractive and only reasonable Nash equilibrium should be a "meeting of the minds" such that the mutual profit is as favorable as possible. With this supplementary principle in addition to symmetry, the predicted provisions are qL = qs = 4. Under the Weakest Link social composition function, the aggregate quantity of the public good would then be Q = 4.
Finally, under Best Shot, matters are somewhat complicated. There are only two deterministic Nash equilibria, in each of which one player provides four units of the public good and the other none. Both of these solutions evidently fail to satisfy the symmetry principle. There is, however, a symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. Although actually finding it posed quite a daunting problem for our experimental subjects, that was nevertheless the "prediction" we adopted. By varying the contribution level one cent at a time, subjects could effectively provide units of the public good in increments of q = .012195. A continuous approximation of the equilibrium mixed strategy involves providing zero units of the public good with probability .8, the remaining probability being distributed over the interval from q = 0 to q = 4. 1.2' As summarized in table 7 and figure 3, the results in the sealed-bid experiments fall considerably short of the excellent matches between predicted and actual results achieved under the sequential protocol. ' The exact Nash equilibrium mixed strategy in the sealed-bid Best Shot case is a discrete probability distribution for q rising in steps of' .012195 (which is the fraction of a unit purchased by a one-cent incremental contribution) over the range q = 0 to q = 4. Following the suggestion of an anonymous referee, to achieve a computationally feasible solution we calculated a continuous approximation of' the equilibrium discrete strategy using the function V(q) = 1.025q -.025q2 in place of' the step function for total redemption value shown in the last column of' table 3. If' we let F(q) be the cumulative density function and j(q) the probability density function of' the mixed strategy employed by the opponent, a player's expected "profit" from providing any amount q is ,7(q) = [F(q)(1.025q -.025q2 -.82q)] + (1.025x -.025x2 -.82q)f'(x)dx.
The first term on the right-hand side here shows the expected profit when the amount q provided by the player is larger than the opponent's level of provision, while the second term shows the profit when it is the opponent who makes the bigger contribution. For F(q) to be a symmetrical mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, the profitability must be the same for all levels of' q employed with positive probability density. That is, T'(q) = 0. Differentiating the term in brackets in the expression above fou iT, we obtain .82 (q) 1.025 -.05q
Notice that there is a discrete probability mass at q = 0, to wit, F(O) = .8 precisely. The probability density is positive over the range from q = 0 to q = 4.1.
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The one exception is the Weakest Link case, in which the observed results here do track the theoretical prediction reasonably well, though still not nearly as closely as under the sequential protocol. For Standard Summation, the predicted equal distribution of the public-good provision, q . qs = 2, was not borne out. It looks as if the partners were groping in the dark, trying out all kinds of possibilities, as evidenced by the huge spread between the average of the larger provisions (qi = 3.063) and of the smaller (qs = 0.782). Surprisingly, the average social aggregate Q = 3.845 was quite close to the theoretical prediction Q = 4. But this average is misleading since it hides the serious undershooting and overshooting that occurred in many cases and caused a loss of profit to the players. We discuss this further in the next subsection.
Finally, for Best Shot the shoe is somewhat on the other foot. Here the larger versus smaller relative provisions are heavily disproportionate as predicted. But, in aggregate, far more units are being provided than predicted. In consequence, however, the parties are getting substantially closer to the efficient solution; in fact, they are generating an average 26.1 percent of the efficient number of units rather than the mere 11.7 percent that the theory indicated.
Provision versus Profit
Up to now our evaluation of the experimental results has run entirely in terms of individual and social provisions of the public good: the efficient, predicted, and experimentally observed magnitudes q, and Q. For some purposes, particularly with regard to degree of efficiency achieved, it is more accurate to think in terms of individual and group "profit," a term used here in place of what the textbooks would call consumer surplus."
In comparing the results in terms of public-good provisions versus profits, the following are some points of interest.
1. Quite commonly the partner contributing the smaller provision reaps the larger profit, a result stemming from the nature of public goods and the benefit of free-riding.
2. In terms of efficiency achieved, the results tend to "look better" when scaled in terms of aggregate profit II rather than in terms of aggregate social provision Q. The reason is that an efficiency failure essentially always takes the form of a shortfall in the social provision of the public good; given the fact of diminishing returns, the shortfall involves units of lower marginal benefit than the units actually provided. This argument also indicates why efficiency is more correctly measured in terms of aggregate profit rather than number of units of the public good provided.
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3. One notable exception to the preceding generalization is the result for Weakest Link under the sealed-bid protocol. Here the observed individual and aggregate provisions qs, qL, and Q all are not too far from the 100 percent efficiency predictions, but the TUJ and H profit observations are way off the mark. In fact, TI. is so heavily negative as to justtIt H into the negative region. But these anomalies are somewhat "accidental." It so happened that in Weakest Link the theoretical aggregate profits are very small in magnitude compared with the other two social composition functions: $0.84 versus $7.56. Since each single unit provided costs $0.82, any substantial error made by any individual-particularly an overshooting-even on a single trial was liable to seriously affect the overall average. What occurred here, specifically, is that in the very first period when the subjects were still operating entirely in the dark, one player in each of two experimental pairs overshot by enough to generate a relatively huge negative profit. These two instances were numerically heavy enough to dominate the average calculated over 50 trials since in all the other cases the observed profits were (as predicted) quite close to zero in numerical magnitude. 
V. Summary
The experiments reported on here were designed to test whether voluntary private provision of public goods met theoretical expectations under the assumption of rational, self-interested behavior. We go beyond the previous experimental literature in examining individual and group choices under alternative social composition functions, making explicit use of alternative decision protocols. Three social composition functions were studied: Standard Summation, Weakest Link, and Best Shot. Theoretical considerations indicated that the traditional result as to "underprovision" of public goods under Standard Summation would be substantially mitigated under Weakest Link but aggravated under Best Shot.
Under our sequential protocol, we conducted a trio of experiments, one for each of the social composition functions. In each group (pair) of subjects the second mover had enough information to make an explicit optimizing choice, but the first mover had to act in ignorance of his or her partner's likely later behavior. The actual results averaged over periods and replications squared remarkably with those predicted.
Under our sealed-bid protocol, both group members were in the dark as to partners' likely behavior. To overcome nonuniqueness of the Nash equilibrium here, two supplementary principles were appealed to: (i) only symmetrical solutions were considered, and (ii) among symmetrical solutions the Pareto-dominant one was chosen. Since the informational problem was notably more difficult under sealed-bid, and just what would constitute rational behavior subject to some question, we anticipated a poorer fit between observed and predicted results. While this indeed occurred, in some respects the subjects did manage to go a surprising distance toward theoretical anticipations.
For the sequential experiments, our results may be regarded as strongly confirming a compound hypothesis that the subjects (a) acted in a rational, self-interested way, (b) believed that their partners would behave similarly, and (c) correctly conjectured that their payoffs were symmetrical with those of their partners. For the experiments conducted under the sealed-bid protocol, this compound hypothesis was less adequately confirmed. Further study will be necessary to specify which portions failed and to what degree.
